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RANDOM PATROL
An Application of Game Theory to Police Problems
R. DEAN SMITH
The author is Director for Research and Development, Field Service Division, International
Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Smith is a graduate of the School of Criminology, University of
California, Berkeley, where he received both a bachelor and master degree. Prior to his present assignment, he served on the Oakland, California, Police Department and as a staff member of the Traffic
Institute of Northwestern University, where he was assigned to the Research Division.
In presenting this paper, the editorial board recognizes a new type of research tool which Mr. Smith
has applied to police problems. In his article, the example cited has been reduced to the simplest terms,
and to many experienced police officers the ultimate conclusion may seem obvious. The article is not
presented with the idea of solving this particular simplified problem, but rather to call attention
to the methods that are available and to arouse interest of our readers in the application of game
theory to police problems.-EnIIoa.
This article has been developed for two purposes.
First it is intended to demonstrate an application
of a relatively new operations research technique
(Game Theory), and secondly, in the course of the
demonstration, to analyze one of the oldest precepts of crime prevention.
Game theory was first introduced about three
decades ago by John von Neumann. In 1944 von
Neumann and Morgenstern presented a work
which applied the theory to certain aspects of
economic behavior. Since that time the theory has
become increasingly useful, and with the development of electronic computers it has become a very
powerful problem-solving technique.
The analysis presented here is a simple one. The
reader will be taken step by step through the
process of the decision game and in the end, if all
goes well, the possibility of other applications in
the police field will become apparent.
Game theory, as the name implies, relates to
situations in which a game-like conflict exists between two persons or parties. This conflict need not
be as harmless as those found in ordinary parlors.
It can, and often does, involve life and death. Application of the theory has been made to such
problems as, searching for enemy submarines, the
deployment of field forces in battle, determining
the locations and types of industrial or military
target areas to be bombed.
To demonstrate the application of game theory
as an analytical tool, we will examine the conflict
between the criminal and the police. Admitting
that this is a very large and complex conflict, we

will, for the purpose of demonstration, limit ourselves to one important part. We will analyze the
conflict between criminals in general and a single
beat patrol officer.
There are two forces of interest in this conflict:
1. The criminal wants to commit his crime and
escape apprehension.
2. The officer wants to prevent the crime and/or
apprehend the criminal.
This is clearly a conflict of interest. We are interested, of course, in helping the officer. There
are several things we could do to assist the officer. First, we could remove all persons from his
beat area and erect a barricade around it. This
would certainly prevent a considerable amount of
crime in that area. Secondly, we could assign
about 1,000 extra officers to him and allow him to
use them where he saw fit. Neither of these ideas
is practical for obvious reasons. Finally, we can
help the officer analyze his problem and perhaps,
if our thinking is straight, we may be able to
insure him some advantage over the criminal, or
at least, failing to give him a definite advantage,
we can protect him against the worse possible
disadvantage.
ELEMNTS OF THE PROBE

What are the elements of the patrolman's
problem? There are thousands of them, of course,
but let us be concerned only with a few of the
more obvious and more important ones. First the
officer (call him Waldo) can be in one, and only
one, place at a given time. He cannot alway!
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make his move (take his turn at play) since he is
not always available to move. Waldo drinks coffee
and eats lunch, etc.
Waldo, for the past year, has been keeping a
score card accounting for each crime that has
occurred on each of the four blocks in his beat. He
therefore knows what has happened and when and
where it has happened. He also knows that it is
more important to prevent certain more serious
crimes than others.
Waldo already has one slight advantage. Looking at his score card he can tell which blocks are
most often attacked during which hours of his tour
of duty. He reasons: "If I figure out the percentage
of crimes by block, then all I need to do is divide
my time according to the same percentage, and
spend that amount of time on each block." He
reasons further: "If I do that, the criminal will
soon figuie that I am spending a certain amount of
time in each block and he will make it a point to
be somewhere else in my beat. What I must do
is figure a way to be where I am needed as often
as possible, but I must at the same time be unpredictable."
Waldo's problem boils down to this: He must
recognize that the criminal will take advantage of
him if he becomes systematic about his patrol work.
At the same time, he cannot figure a way to be
where he should be without being systematic.
The dilemma has a solution, but it is not necessarily
the kind of a solution we find in fairy tales. We
cannot guarantee to Waldo that he will always be
where he should be. We can guarantee to him,
however, that we will maximize the minimum
winnings for each of his moves in the conflict
game. His "winnings" in this game, of course, are
the points he gets for being where he should be.
This idea of maximizing a minimum may seem
a bit strange at first. It is very important that it is
completely understood, however. To maximize a
minimum does not mean that we are going to win
as much as possible at each play of the game. It
does mean that we are going to keep the least
possible amount we can win at each play of the
game at its highest possible level.'
As small as Waldo's problem is, it is much too
complex for him or anyone else to solve unless it is
reduced to a form where by it may be manipulated.
Game theory does this for him. What we must

discover is a set of strategies (moves) that will
yield the largest return of the minimum winnings
for each of Waldo's plays in the game. We want to
tell Waldo how many times he should be in each
block in his beat, and also the order in which he
should cover the blocks in his beat in his conflict
with the criminal. (How many times he should
make a particular move and when he should make
it.)
In our solution we will be working with what is
called a "Game Matrix." 2 We will confine our
illustrative problem to a small.2 x 2 (two by two)
matrix since they are the easiest to handle.
A Practice Set. Waldo is an accomplished beat
officer. He is assigned the task of protecting a bank
and a melon patch. At any one time he may
protect either, but not both, against attack.
Oswald is a criminal, and he is interested in
stealing-from either the bank or the melon patch.
He may steal from either, but not both, at any
one time.
For our purposes the values of the places are
the same to both the officer and the criminal. They
both figure that the melon patch is worth 1 point
while the bank is worth 3 points. If, after attack,
both places are still intact, the winning is 4 points
to Waldo. If the melon patch is lost then the
winning is three (he still has the bank). If the
bank is lost the winning is only 1. The points
Waldo wins are the losses of Oswald, and vice versa.
Oswald
Column

Column

2

1

Row 1

4

melon patch
1

Row 2

bank

4

Waldo

3

FiGURE

1

Looking at the game matrix (figure 1), we see
that in order for Oswald to sack the bank he must
attack Column 1, to sack the melon patch he must
attack Column 2. Waldo must likewise defend Row
1 in order to intercept Oswald before he reaches
the bank and thus protect it. Similarly, he must
2 A matrix as here used is simply a rectangular array
of numbers arranged in rows and columns as follows:

Good poker players use this princi-

1

2

ple. In stud poker, for instance, on the second draw, a
good player will not remain in the game with two deuces
when two kings are showing.

3

4
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defend Row 2 to protect the melon patch. The
result of each play is determined by the square in
which the opponents meet.
Now, if Oswald attacks Column 1 and by some
unfortunate accident Waldo decides to defend the
melon patch by going to Row 2, Waldo will lose
the bank and with it three points to the scoundrel
Oswald. What can Waldo do to giveprotection to
both the bank and the melon patch, and hold his
minimum possible winnings to a maximum? He
must compute the game matrix and make his
move accordingly.
There are several techniques available for
computing the game matrix in this problem.
Regardless of which one we use, the results will
be the same. Since we are concerned with demonstrating a general problem solving technique it
would seem appropriate to use the simplest
computational method available. It is not necessary to understand the properties of determinants
to understand the value of the solution to the
game niatrix. We are primarily concerned with
thewhat and whyof thesolution and only academically interested in the technical part of the problem.
The game matrix in figure 1 represents our best
estimate of the problem faced by the Patrolman
Waldo. He has available two alternative moves,
each of which carry some measure of reward. Both
available moves are demanding in the sense that
he is responsible for the protection of both property
locations, the bank and the melon patch. Obviously,
the bank is of greater importance which is why we
assigned a greater value to it (3 points as opposed
to one for the melon patch).
Taking the problem back to the real world we
find our officer standing somewhere between the
bank and the melon patch, and he is trying to
decide to which of the two he should go at this
particular moment. He is faced with the uncertainty, indeed, he is completely ignorant, of which
of the two places will be attacked in the next
moment.
Our officer has a righteous feeling that tells him
he should spend more time protecting the bank
since the loss to society in general could be greater
in the event of attack there than it would were a
few melons lost. Still, the rules demand that he
protect both from the criminal. Common sense
tells the officer that if he spends all of his time
protecting the bank the criminal will soon become
aware of this and spend all of his time stealing
melons. On the other hand, if the officer sits in the
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melon patch the criminal will soon empty the
bank of its treasures. In either event the criminal
would be at a constant advantage and the officer
at a disadvantage.
Waldo must devise a scheme which will provide
him with a set of strategies or moves such that
both the bank and the melon patch are protected,
and in the game matrix he wins as many points as
he can within the rules of the game. Since he is
never sure just what the criminal is going to do,
he wants to protect his bank and the melon patch
against anything the criminal might do. (If he had
sure -knowledge of the criminals movements he
would have few problems). In order that Waldo
may insure himself that the least he can win at
any play of game will be at a maximum, he must
assume one thing. He must consider that the
criminal is an intelligent and clever opponent who
is not going to do anything stupid such as set up a
predictable pattern of moves or attack one or the
other place all of 'the time neglecting the other.
Waldo must assume that the criminal will be at
least as clever as himself.
Operating on this assumption will protect Waldo
from the cleverest criminal and, of course, if the
criminal does anything stupid Waldo will gain from
it. Unfortunately, as we will learn later, the
reverse of this is also true. If Waldo does something
"unwise" then Oswald will gain an advantage
simply because we have made him clever by
definition. Returning to figure 1, we take up the
game matrix again in search of the best strategies
for Waldo in his conflict with Oswald, the criminal.
Waldo will be moving across the board (figuratively, of course) in the rows. Oswald, in the same
sense, will be moving down in the columns. Row
number one, in this conflict, represents defense of
the bank to Waldo. Column number one represents
robbing the bank to Oswald. Thus, where Oswald
attacks in Column 1 he is going for the bank.
To head Oswald off and save the bank Waldo
must go to Row 1. Were he to go to Row 2, the
melon patch, the criminal would have a free chance
at the bank and win 3 points. That is to say, if
Waldo is in 4 of Row 1 and Oswald attacks the
bank, Oswald will be arrested and Waldo wins 4
points. Likewise, Waldo being in 4 of Row 2 and
Oswald attacks the melon patch, Oswald will be
arrested and Waldo wins 4 points.
We are now ready to compute Waldo's strategies. The computations are correct, and the reader
may accept them as presented without too much
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the sum of Waldo's strategies (I + 3 = 4), we
have 1Y = 3.25.
If Waldo's computed strategies always yield
the same expected value when played against
Oswald then we know that they are the best
mixed set we can get.

concern for their derivation. If further details are
desired, the reader is referred to the reference at
the end of the text. To compute the strategies we
subtract Column 2 from Column 1 in each row.
That is, we subtract 1 from 4 in Row 1 and 4 from
3 in Row 2. The results are 3 in Row I and - I in
Row 2. Now we switch the rows, which gives us
-1 in Row 1 and 3 in Row 2. These are set
forth in the right hand column of figure 2.

Oswald (1)

Oswald
Column 1 Column 2

Row I

4

1

Row 2

3

4

(1X4)+(3X3)
1+3

4+9
4

13
4

Waldo's
Strategies

-1

Waldo
3

FIGURE 2

To test these strategies they must be "played"
against either of Oswald's moves. Waldo is going
to play his strategies (1 and 3) against any single
or mixed set of moves by Oswald. Oswald is
selecting columns and Waldo is selecting rows.
Oswald's first strategy is Column 1 (it could be
either 1 or 2 since we are not concerned with
what he does). If Oswald plays Column 1 then he
stands a chance of winning 3 points or losing 4,
depending upon Waldo's defensive more. To
compute Waldo's maximum winnings we simply
play his strategies (1 and 3) against either outcome
(Oswald selects Column 1 or 2). For Oswald's
choice of Column 1 the computation (disregarding
negative signs) is set forth in figure 3. We then

Oswald (2)

4

Row2

3

1+12

4

13
-

34

In both cases the yield is 3.25, so we know our
strategies are good. The value 3.25 represents the
expected winnings of Waldo for each play of the
the game against Oswald's attempts to capture
either the bank or the melon patch.
So we have guaranteed Waldo that if he plays
the game according to our computed mixture he
will be able to expect no less than 3.25 points for
each play of the game---on one other condition.
This other condition is a simple one. Waldo must
select his strategies in a random manner so that
Oswald will never be able to predict what he will

Oswald
Column I
Column 2

Row 1

(1 X 1)+ (3 X 4)
1 +3

Waldo's
Strategies

-1

Waldo

1X4= 4
3X3= 9
4-+9= 13

FIGURE 3

divide the value 13 by the sum of the computed
strategies (1 + 3 = 4). 1% = 3.25. This gives
us the "average" or expected payoff for this
strategy.
Figure 4 shows the computations for Oswald's
choice of Column 2. Again dividing the value by

do. To do this Waldo must devise some means for
random action. An easy way would be to look at
his watch, and if the sweep second hand is between
zero and fifteen seconds to the minute, he should
select Row 2. If it is between fifteen seconds to the
minute and zero, he should select Row 1. (figure 5).

Oswald
Column I

Rowi

Waldo's

Column 2

1

Strategies

1

IX1=

1

-= 4X3=12

Waldo
Row 2

4
F16URE 4

3

12+1 = 13
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45",

4511

30"

151"

30
Select Row 1

Select Row 2
(3 out of 4)

(1 out of 4)
FiGuRE 5

What would happen to Waldo's expected
winnings if he decided to ignore his computed
strategies, and just try to run alternately from one
place to the other? Then his strategy values are
equal, Le. each 1 and figure 6 computes the winOswald
Column I Column 2

Waldo's
Strategies

Rowi

4

1

1

Row 2

3

4

1

Waldo
(IX4)+(ix3)
+4+3

1+1

2

(1X 1)+ (lX4) 1+4
1+1
2

7
2

5
2

FiGuRE 6

nings. So Waldo would be guaranteed only 2.5
points for each play as against his original 3.25,
and in terms of banks and melon patches one can
ill
afford such a loss[
Now, Waldo has three alternatives open to him
for future game playing. (1) He can go to the
locker room and sulk because the game he is
caught up in seems terribly unfair, since he cannot
win all the time. (2) He can accept the fact that
in this particular game he is going to lose a little
and stick to his strategies, making the criminal
.suffer as much as possible for each of his depravities. Or, finally, Waldo can cheat. (Not in the
moral sense, of course.)
How can Waldo cheat the criminal out of his
unjust winnings? In the first place, he can try to
get a peek at the "next move" the criminal is
contemplating, and at the same time hold his
own cards dose to his chest. The use of informers,
after all, is not a new idea in the "game" of cops
and robbers.3 Waldo should try to gather informa3The term "game" is used here to relate only to the
subject and not to the business of professional law enforcement.

tion about the criminal beyond the basic tabulation
of the history of his behavior.
This kind of cheating is accepted in other games,
such as Poker. The two games (our example and
Poker) are comparable in the sense that in both
cases the eventual outcome of the game, without
the accepted cheating, is determined strictly upon
the distribution of either cards or criminals. If, in a
Draw Poker game, we were to accept our cards and
then draw out the desired number from the remaining deck, paying no attention to the post-deal
behavior of the other players, then the status of
the game would not change much. However, we
do listen carefully to the call for cards as each
player draws, and this information adds to our
total knowledge of what is going on. We recognize
the difference between drawing three cards and
drawing none, and this behavior on the part of
the other players gives us a small, if not always
accurate "peek" at our opponents' hands. So
peek when you can, whatever the game.
The game in our example was based upon the
assumption of ignorance of all bat the past behavior of the criminals. We designated a set of
strategies which, under these conditions, would
guarantee a maximum of the minimum expected
winnings for each play of the game. If Waldo
can improve upon the state of his knowledge about
the moves of the criminal, then he is going to
benefit. If he cannot improve then he is stuck (in
this game at least) with a regular expected winning
of 3.25.
Randomness in Moves. The strategies computed
for the example game, as with all such games, must
be selected in a random manner for play. The
strategies would be quite worthless unless they
were played as a result of being selected by some
random device. Just as a strategy is not very
good if it can be predicted, so is a policeman not
very effective if he can be predicted. The trick is
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to improve your ability to predict the opponent,
and at the same time reduce your opponent's
ability to predict your moves. The best design is
to make your moves in a random manner according to the computed scheme. If you cannot be
completely random, the at least make every
effort to be unpredictable. If a (beat) officer
becomes a predictable agent, then his effectiveness
is impaired and he gives advantage to the enemy.

REFERENCE
An exposition and discussion of Game Theory is contained in the book, The Comple. Strategyst, by J.
D. Williams, published by the McGraw-Hill Company, New York City. The section of the book
upon which Random Patrol is based is Chapter 4,
pages 132-146. The entire book is on the theory of
games of strategy and should be of exceptional
value to persons who are not trained in mathematics.

